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Abstract The continued growth and evolution of the offshore wind industry, and the
emergence of other novel marine uses such as wave and tidal generators, have upped
the ante for spatial planners, as well as consenting and approval authorities in various
coastal states. These stakeholders rely on processes such as navigational risk assess-
ments (NRAs) to balance safety and efficiency requirements and to make optimal
decisions over use of space. Given the increasingly complex and crowded seascape,
however, there are some apprehensions about potential shortcomings in these NRA
processes. There is also some concern that these inadequacies may lead to unsafe or
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inefficient marine spatial use. To understand how NRA processes can be improved
further, a literature review is conducted, followed by a survey of respondents who are
involved in the planning, consenting and/or approval of offshore wind farms across
seven different countries. A summary of the NRA processes in these seven countries is
presented, and several shortcomings are identified. Based on the findings of the survey,
a list of recommendations is presented to enhance existing NRA processes—and to
improve the coexistence of shipping and offshore wind farms (OWFs).
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
As the harsh realities of climate change become ever more apparent, there is a
noticeable shift towards increased renewable energy generation. One of the most
common renewable energy sources is wind power (Engie.be 2017; AP 2018). Signif-
icant technological advancements—as well as improved installation, maintenance and
decommissioning strategies (Maegaard et al. 2013a, b; Mehdi et al. 2016)—have
particularly boosted the reliability of offshore wind farms (OWFs) and driven down
the associated levelized cost of energy (LCOE) (Siemens 2014; GWEC 2016). This,
along with widespread social acceptance (Henderson et al. 2003; Haggett 2008; Hattam
et al. 2015), has also contributed to the increasing popularity of OWFs.
Despite its many advantages, however, offshore wind energy generation is also
plagued with a plethora of challenges. For instance, there are still some lingering
concerns about the technical challenges, reliability and cost-effectiveness facing OWFs
(Ostachowicz et al. 2016). As such, there have been several studies on the life cycle
economic (e.g. Blanco 2009; Snyder and Kaiser 2009) and environmental impacts (e.g.
Weinzettel et al. 2009; Wang and Sun 2012) of OWFs to address some of the
aforementioned concerns.
In addition to the technical and cost-related challenges, further barriers to the
continued growth of the offshore wind industry stem from the environmental impact
of OWFs. Marine biologists, for instance, carefully scrutinize the impact of OWFs on
marine life (e.g. Köller et al. 2006; Degraer and Brabant 2009; Andersson 2011; Bailey
et al. 2014; Bray et al. 2016; Verfuss et al. 2016). Similarly, ornithologists are often
concerned that OWFs may negatively affect the migration and breeding patterns of
various avian species (e.g. Desholm and Kahlert 2005; Dierschke et al. 2006; Hüppop
et al. 2006; Degraer and Brabant 2009; Beiersdorf and Radecke 2014; New et al. 2015).
Furthermore, there are also other environmental and societal impacts of OWFs—such
as the perceptions of coastal communities—that can also be viewed as potential
barriers; these topics are covered in works such as those of Devine-Wright (2005),
Lacroix and Pioch (2011), Ladenburg (2011) and Chen et al. (2015).
A crucial topic often discussed in the context of environmental impacts is the
interaction between OWFs and maritime activities. This multi-dimensional interaction
is often viewed as a marine spatial conflict, with both industries vying for adequate
space in marine areas that may be already overcrowded with other multiple uses.
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Subsequently, this interaction between OWFs and maritime operations is the subject of
a vast body of both academic and non-academic literature. For instance, Chircop and
L’Esperance (2016) have discussed the legal aspects of this interaction, whilst there
have also been some interesting investigations regarding vessel re-routing to reduce the
costs associated with OWFs by authors such as Samoteskul et al. (2014).
The most widely explored topic under the broader thematic area of OWF-maritime
interactions is the effect of OWFs on maritime navigational safety. There is consensus
amongst stakeholders acknowledging that OWFs can pose risks to maritime operations
in terms of reduced navigational safety (Wright et al. 2016; Mehdi and Schröder-
Hinrichs 2016). Simply put, the presence of an OWFmeans more obstacles in the water
that ships have to avoid. OWFs may also restrict the navigable space available to ships,
leading to increased traffic density and an increased risk of collision. It is also well
established that offshore wind turbines (OWTs) may interfere with ships’ on-board
navigation equipment such as radar and other radio-frequency devices (MARICO
2007; de la Vega et al. 2013; MCA 2016). All these factors, and more, can be
detrimental to navigational safety.
1.2 Environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and navigational risk assessments
(NRAs)
The complex, multi-dimensional impacts of OWFs need to be addressed before projects
can be approved and licensed. This is usually done through a process called an
‘environmental impact assessment’. The Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (SCBD) concisely defines EIA as ‘a process of evaluating the likely envi-
ronmental impacts of a proposed project or development, taking into account inter-
related socio-economic, cultural and human-health impacts, both beneficial and ad-
verse’ (SCBD 2005). In essence, an EIA assesses the impacts of infrastructure like
OWFs on other systems such as the marine environment, shipping, tourism and leisure
craft activities, fishing and aquaculture, or even other existing offshore renewable
energy installations (OREIs) in the area. A core feature of an EIA is to also assess
the cumulative impacts, which are defined as the ‘impacts on the environment which
results from incremental impacts of the action when added to other past, present and
reasonably foreseeable future actions’. (IEMA 2004). In other words, the cumulative
impact assessment (CIA) stage in the EIA allows users to holistically understand the
impact of a project like an OWF, by exploring the inter-relations between the different
impacts, past, present and future.
Of all the different impacts related to OWFs, the focus of the current work is on the
safety impact faced by ships. Shipping has an impact on where OWFs can be located,
as well as an impact on the marine environment. Similarly, OWFs can have an impact
on shipping efficiency (by forcing ships to take longer routes) and safety.
Maritime safety incidents can be very expensive for all parties involved, and in the
absolute worst cases, such incidents can lead to human casualties or serious environmental
damage. This is the core reason why authorities who are involved in the consenting and
approval of OWFs tend to pay special attention to the maritime risks associated with
OWFs (MCA 2013; BSH 2015; NIP 2017). In most coastal states, there are stringent
processes requiring OWF owners/developers to demonstrate that they have thoroughly
assessed the maritime risks and implemented adequate risk management measures (BSH
Improving the coexistence of offshore wind farms and shipping: an... 399
2015; MCA 2013). These processes are generally referred to as navigational risk assess-
ments (NRAs), and are often a part of the EIA studies for OWFs. Although NRAs are
generally commissioned by OWF developers (only in the Netherlands that the state itself
conducts the NRA) and checked by approval authorities as a part of the licensing process,
there are also examples of NRAs being used as part of the marine spatial planning (MSP)
process in countries like Belgium and the Netherlands.
The core premise of the NRA process is to assess the risk of maritime accidents1 in
the vicinity of OWFs. In this case, ‘risk’ is defined as ‘a combination of the probability
and consequences of undesirable events that arise due to a permutation of passive
hazards and active failures in a system or a process’ (Mehdi and Schröder-Hinrichs
2018). The terms ‘probability’ and ‘consequence’ refer to the likelihood of an accident
happening, and the nature and severity of an accident respectively. Thus, an NRA
process essentially enables stakeholders to assess the probability, consequence and
overall risk that an OWF poses to ship safety, through the use of various methods,
models, tools and even stakeholder feedback. The probability of an accident in a NRA
is generally assessed by considering vessel traffic movements in an area and by
predicting the impact on vessel movements if an obstruction such as an OWF is
installed, or if the safe room available for vessels is reduced due to an OWF. The
probability is often calculated as a ‘return period’—i.e. the expected length of time
between accidents, given the number of ship movements in an area. The consequences
of an accident are generally calculated by considering ship speed, types and sizes. Both
the consequences and probabilities can be assessed either qualitatively or quantitatively
in a NRA; the crucial element is to determine the change in the levels of probabilities
and consequences (and therefore risk) before and after an OWF is built.
By conducting a NRA, it is therefore possible to evaluate whether or not the
presence of an OWF will significantly increase navigational risk, beyond an unaccept-
able level. The ‘acceptable’ level of risk is itself defined as the maximum combined
level of probability and consequence which would be acceptable to stakeholders of a
system. Generally, the higher the probability of an accident, the lower the acceptable
consequences—and vice versa. In other words, if the likelihood of an accident is high,
the consequences must be low—and if the consequences are high, the probability must
be low. The acceptable levels of risk are generally determined via stakeholder feedback
at the initiation of a NRA process. If, during the NRA, the risk posed by an OWF to
ship safety exceeds the acceptable level of probability and/or consequence, developers
are required to implement risk-control options (RCOs). RCOs are measures which can
reduce the probability and/or consequences of an accident. For instance, having
collision-friendly turbines which cause minimal damage to ship hulls is a
consequence-reducing RCO. Similarly, safety distances between OWFs and shipping
lanes, or other routing measures, and nautical marks are probability-reducing RCOs, as
they help to mitigate the likelihood of incidents. RCOs should be cost-effective,
however—and if it is unfeasible to mitigate the risk, the project is scrapped.
NRAs often make use of existing methods and models. One common method
recommended by several states for NRA is the International Maritime Organization’s
1 All countries considered in the present study require developers to assess the risk of all the following
navigational accidents: powered and drifting contact (vessel-turbine) accidents, powered collision (vessel-
vessel) accidents and powered and drifting grounding accidents.
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(IMO’s) Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), which is a five-step process, as follows
(IMO 2002):
1. Hazard identification—What might go wrong?
2. Risk and hazard evaluation and assessment—How badly, and how likely? Step 2 is
often combined with tools and models from probability and consequence estimation.
3. Identification of risk-control measures—Can the situation be improved, and how?
4. Cost-benefit analysis for risk-control measures—Is it worth implementing new
measures?
5. Decisions, suggestions and recommendations—What should the next steps be?
As the offshore wind energy sector has evolved, so too have the OWF planning,
consenting and approval processes (Gibson and Howsam 2010)—and NRAs are no
exception. This evolution has also stimulated the development of various novel risk-
based methods, models and tools that can be used specifically for NRAs around OWFs;
authors such as Mehdi and Schröder-Hinrichs (2016) and Deeb et al. (2017) have
conducted a comprehensive review of such tools and models. However, whether or not
these developments are enough to address the challenges associated with increasingly
complex and crowded marine areas remains to be seen.
1.3 Problem description
According to a recent report, Europe—the region leading the world in terms of the
number of OWFs—has about 3.5k OWTs with a total installed capacity of 12.6 GWas
of 2016 (WindEurope 2017). The same report also mentions that an additional 4.8 GW
worth of offshore wind projects are currently under construction, 24.2 GW have been
consented, 7 GW are pending approval and a staggering 65.6 GW more projects are
planned—in just European waters. If these projects become a reality, one can expect
almost a sixfold increase in the number of OWTs and OWFs, in a region where marine
areas are already quite crowded by shipping traffic and other marine uses such as
fisheries, leisure activities, military activities and protected areas—not to mention test
sites for other marine renewable energy developments, including wave and tidal
generators.
Industry predictions also forecast that OWTs will get larger and more complex (e.g.
larger rotors, floating turbines,2 vertical axis turbines), and OWFs will continue to grow
in size and number over the upcoming years. There are also strong indications that
OWFs continue to move further away from shore towards deeper water to better exploit
the wind resource (WindEurope 2017; GWEC 2016).
Unquestionably, the burden on marine spatial planners, and approval and consenting
authorities, is immense. In the context of the OWF-maritime interaction, these stake-
holders have to ensure that OWFs have a minimal impact on the safety and efficiency
of shipping operations—whilst simultaneously maximizing renewable energy genera-
tion potential and finding optimal locations for such installations. And in balancing the
needs of the OWF and maritime industries, the leeway for over- or under-design for
2 The world’s first and largest floating OWF is due to be completed in 2017, off the coast of Scotland. It will
consist of 5 × 6 MW Hywind turbines.
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safety and efficiency is minimal to none—particularly in already-crowded marine areas.
Since planners and approval authorities rely on processes like NRAs to ensure that
every bit of the available marine space is used as safely and efficiently as possible, these
processes need to be quite robust. An NRA that is overly conservative may lead to
inefficiency: ships may have to be unreasonably re-routed, or OWF layouts may have
to be curbed unnecessarily due to overestimation of navigational risks. A poorly
conducted NRA may also lead to reduced safety: an underestimation of the maritime
risks could mean that adequate risk-control measures are not implemented, potentially
exacerbating the probability and consequences of accidents even further. Therefore, a
NRA—like everything in the age-old fable of Goldilocks, or the Swedish concept of
‘lagom’—needs to be ‘just right’.
There are thus two primary objectives of the present research:
1. To explore whether current NRA processes are robust enough to deal with an
increasingly complex and crowded seascape and
2. To understand the shortcomings, if any, that need to be addressed in order to
improve the coexistence of the maritime and offshore wind industries
2 Literature review
The first step in fulfilling the primary objectives is to conduct a thorough literature
review. While there is ample literature that deals with NRA-related topics in general,
not many publications address the shortcomings of existing NRA processes.
A bulk of the NRA-related literature stemming from academic and research sources
deals with the development and theoretical application of various risk-based tools,
methods and models that allow users to calculate the probability and consequences of
maritime accidents in the vicinity of OWFs (Mehdi and Schröder-Hinrichs 2016; Deeb
et al. 2017). By contrast, non-academic or ‘grey literature’—which includes industrial
standards, technical reports and approval studies conducted for planned and consented
OWFs (NIP 2017)—provides plentiful examples of these tools, methods and models
being applied in practice during actual NRAs. A cursory comparison of the academic
and non-academic literature offers an interesting initial insight towards the shortcom-
ings of existing NRA processes: it is apparent that academics and researchers have
developed state-of-the-art tools, methods and models which seem to be underutilized
by the industry.
One can also try to identify the shortcomings of existing NRA processes by
attempting to understand what drives the development of certain models. It is fairly
evident that a lot of recently developed models for NRA attempt to compensate for a
‘lack of past knowledge’: OWFs are still fairly novel developments, and the scarcity of
accidents—whilst good—means that there is a certain lack of experience. In fact, a lot
of the models and tools used for OWF NRA were originally developed for NRAs
around oil platforms, bridges, quays and other marine structures—and adapted accord-
ingly (Mehdi and Schröder-Hinrichs 2016). Although these tools have undoubtedly
played an important role in helping to mitigate the risk of accidents near OWFs, there is
always the lingering concern that the models used in current NRA processes may be
under- or overly conservative, and thus do not allow sea-space to be efficiently utilized.
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This indicates another potential shortcoming of existing NRA processes: the lack of
adequate input data (such as accident details and statistics) and experience.
In a recent study on seafarer perceptions of OWFs (Mehdi et al. 2017a), respondents
were asked whether they were aware of any NRA studies for OWFs. Of the 150
respondents, only 24 (16%) indicated that they were. And of these 24, only 13 indicated
that they agreed with the results of NRAs. In fact, the findings of this study indicate a
positive correlation between awareness of NRA studies and the level of concern
regarding maritime safety risks associated with OWFs. NRAs should alleviate and
not exacerbate the concerns of stakeholders such as seafarers. Thus, these findings
point to yet another possible shortcoming of existing NRA processes: the inadequacy to
address concerns of operational end users, including seafarers.
The sparse literature that is dedicated to comparing and identifying shortcomings in
existing NRA processes provides some interesting information as well. In particular, a
report by Ellis et al. (2008)—which compares various existing navigational risk
models—identifies a lack of harmonization as another shortcoming that can be associated
with OWFNRAs. The report also explicitly mentions a certain lack of transparencywhen
it comes to models and tools that are used for NRA; specifically, the reports highlight
some discrepancies in the probability calculations which are used to assess the likelihood
of maritime accidents due to the presence of an OWF. The discussion and conclusion of
this report suggest that despite the initiation of projects such as SAFESHIP3 or Safety at
Sea—which attempted to address exactly these harmonization and transparency con-
cerns—these shortcomings were not adequately addressed at the time.
Based on the findings of the literature review, the perceived shortcomings within
NRA processes can be initially summarized as follows:
1. Lack of harmonization between the NRA processes in different countries
2. Lack of transparency within certain (commercial) models and tools
3. Lack of adequate input data, stemming from a lack of ‘past experience’ specific to
OWFs
4. Inadequacy of NRA studies to alleviate the concerns of seafarers
5. Underutilization of novel models and methods that are developed by researchers
3 Methodology
A literature review alone is not enough to conclusively prove whether any of the
aforementioned NRA-related shortcomings are actually of concern. The work of Ellis
et al. (2008), for instance, is now nearly a decade old—which means that their findings
may not necessarily be valid anymore. Similarly, issues that the current authors
perceive to be shortcomings may not necessarily be viewed as such by stakeholders
who are actually involved in the NRA process.
To overcome this gap in knowledge, representatives of OWF approval authorities
from several different countries were surveyed. All respondents have a similar role in
3 SAFESHIP (Reduction of Ship Collision Risks for Offshore Wind Farms)–EU Project conducted between
2003 and 2005, sponsored by European Commission through the 5th Research and Technological Develop-
ment Framework Programme.
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their organization and are currently involved in the approval process for OWFs in their
respective countries from their respective maritime departments. The organizations
listed in Table 1 are those that have the most direct link to NRAs: in six of the seven
countries, the respondents’ organizations set out the guidelines for the NRA and also
ensure that developers follow these guidelines when they conduct an NRA for an OWF
license or approval; in the case of the Netherlands, the organization (Rijkswaterstaat)
itself is responsible for conducting the NRA, disseminating the results amongst poten-
tial OWF developers and ensuring compliance with the findings at the approval stage.
All the respondents, from each of the organizations, thus work hands-on with NRAs
and have a technical nautical background which enables them to verify and validate the
findings.
The survey was conducted as a structured interview. The respondents were sent a list
of questions beforehand, so they could comment on it and prepare for the interview.
The interview questions were divided into two parts. The first set of questions was
designed to collect information regarding the data, tools, methods and models that are
commonly used for probability and consequence assessments during NRAs. The
respondents were also asked to identify some key stakeholders that are involved in
the NRA process. The purpose of these questions was to obtain an in-depth under-
standing of the NRA processes in different countries.
The second set of questions consisted of a list of ten statements. These statements
were derived through the findings of the literature review (§2), and were designed to
determine whether any of the identified shortcomings within the existing NRA pro-
cesses are (still) of concern. The respondents were asked to rate their agreement with
each of these statements using a standard Likert scale of agreement (Vagias 2006); the
levels on the five-point Likert scale ranged from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’.
The respondents were also encouraged to identify any further shortcomings that they
perceive within existing NRA processes.
Table 1 Respondents involved in current study
Country Organization No. of
respondents
Role
United Kingdom Maritime & Coastguard
Agency (MCA)
1 Verifying NRAs conducted by OWF
developers during licensing and
approval stages—specifically,
verifying compliance of OWFs
in terms of navigational safety
risks with reference to national
guidelines and regulations;
liaising with stakeholders during
approval and licensing process to
provide information pertinent to
NRA; participating in stakeholder
workshops
Germany Budesamt für Seeschifffart
und Hydrographie (BSH)
1
Denmark Søfartsstyrelsen (DMA)*† 1
The Netherlands Rijkswaterstaat (RWS)‡ 1
Belgium FOD Mobiliteit (FOD)* 1
Sweden Transportstyrelsen (STA) 2
United States of America United States Coastguard
(USCG)
2
*Respondents are also involved in marine spatial planning processes in their country
†Respondent is also involved with aids to navigation
‡Responsible for conducting the NRA and ensuring developers comply with findings
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3.1 Sampling
The respondents in the present study hail from seven different countries at
different stages of offshore wind sector development. When deciding on which
countries to choose, the primary factor that was considered is the cumulative
offshore wind capacity (COWC) in each country. The COWC indicates the total
installed offshore wind capacity, and can be used as a rough estimate to gauge
the development status of the offshore wind industry in a country. Table 2 shows
the countries covered in the present study, their COWC and their rank in terms
of COWC on a global scale. The second-last column in Table 2 classifies the
development status of the offshore wind industry in different countries based on
COWC.
According to the Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC), there are a total of 15
countries which have OWFs or OWTs. The countries not included in the present study
are China (1627 MW), Japan (60 MW), South Korea (35 MW), Finland (32 MW),
Ireland (25 MW), Spain (5 MW), Norway (2 MW) and Portugal (0 MW4). Of the
countries that are included, there are two ‘established’ (UK, DE), three ‘evolving’ (DK,
NL, BE) and two ‘emerging’ (SE, US) in terms of COWC. The present sample
therefore adequately represents countries at the three different stages of offshore wind
industry development.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 A comparison of existing NRA processes
As the challenges associated with maritime operations in the vicinity of OWFs
are more or less comparable in different areas, one can expect to find quite of
lot of similarities in the NRA processes of various countries. At the same time,
the different stages of offshore wind industry development in various countries
are a reason to believe that there may also be differences in these NRA
processes. A literature review—such as the one conducted by Ellis et al.
(2008) or Mehdi and Schröder-Hinrichs (2016)—points towards both similarities
and dissimilarities amongst the NRA frameworks, models, methods and tools
used by different countries, but is inconclusive in proving whether there are
more differences than similarities in the actual NRA processes.
To further understand the difference and similarities, it is therefore important to learn
directly from the stakeholders who are integrally involved in these NRA processes.
Such stakeholders are generally the ones who are involved in the planning and/or
approval of OWFs from the maritime side. Subsequently, this sub-section summarizes
the key elements of various NRA processes—as described in various national guidance
documents and as explained by people involved in the maritime-related planning and
approval of OWFs in different countries. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the findings in a
comparative manner.
4 The only OWT in Portugal—a 2-MW floating turbine named WindFloat 1—was decommissioned in 2016.
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4.1.1 United Kingdom
When it comes to energy generation from offshore wind, the undisputed leader is the
UK. With 1472 OWTs currently installed, the UK has the greatest COWC (5156 MW)
of all the countries with OWFs as shown in Table 2. The UK also boasts the largest
OWF in the world—London Array, a 630-MW OWF with 175 installed turbines. As
mentioned earlier, the world’s first and largest floating OWF—commissioned in
2017—is also in the UK, just off the coast of Scotland.
A marine license is necessary for all OWFs in the UK, and it is granted by the
various devolved authorities—such as the Marine Management Organization (MMO)
in England or Marine Scotland in Scotland. In order to obtain a marine license, OWF
developers need to conduct a NRA. The purpose of the NRA in the UK, like elsewhere,
is quite simple: to evaluate the risk to shipping without (‘base-case’) and with (‘future-
case’) the proposed OWF—and to demonstrate that the proposed OWF will not lead to
unacceptably high navigational risks. The devolved authorities consult the Maritime
and Coastguard Agency (MCA), as well as other relevant stakeholders, to ensure that a
NRA conducted by an OWF developer is valid and adequate.
The UK’s significant NRA experience is well reflected in comprehensive guidance
documents, which are developed for OWF developers by authorities such as the MCA.
These documents include the well-known ‘Methodology for assessing the marine
navigational safety and emergency response risks of offshore renewable energy instal-
lations’ (MCA 2013) and ‘MGN 543 (M+F) Safety of Navigation: Offshore Renewable
Energy Installations - UK Navigational Practice, Safety and Emergency Response’
(MCA 2016). Both these documents provide a comprehensive list of factors (e.g. vessel
traffic, types of vessels, traffic characteristics, location of routes, routing measures,
bathymetry, waves, winds, currents, OWF layout, OWT marking and lightings, effect
of turbines on navigational equipment, etc.)—as well as a non-exhaustive list of
stakeholders (e.g. RNLI, lighthouse authorities, Chamber of Shipping, recreational
shipping, local fishermen, shipowners and operators, etc.) that need to be considered
during a NRA. These factors and stakeholders were also mentioned by the respondent
during their interview.
Table 2 COWC in different countries, global rank by COWC and classification based on COWC. COWC
data is from GWEC ( 2016)
Country Abbreviation COWC
(MW)
Global rank Classification Notes
United Kingdom UK 5156 1st Established [COWC> 2500 MW]
Germany DE 4108 2nd Established
Denmark DK 1271 4th Evolving [2500 MW>COWC
>500 MW]
The Netherlands NL 1118 5th Evolving
Belgium BE 712 6th Evolving
Sweden SE 202 7th Emerging [COWC< 500 MW]
United States of America US 30 11th Emerging
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The maritime operations that are considered during a NRA in the UK include
passing shipping traffic, wind farm support vessel (WSV) operations, OWF
installation operations and emergency operations such as search and rescue
(SAR). Decommissioning operations are not explicitly covered, nor are operations
in ports and harbours, the latter of which are dealt separately with by harbour
Table 3 Comparison of NRA process in the seven countries
UK DE DK NL BE SE US
1. Is a marine licence necessary for 
offshore wind farm (OWF) 
approval in your country?
Yes
2. Is a navigational risk assessment 
(NRA) necessary for OWF 
approval in your country? 
Yes
No, but 
generally 
included 
3. Who is responsible for conducting 
this NRA? OWF Developer
Federal 
maritime 
authority
OWF Developer
4. Do you have any national 
guidelines on NRA? Yes Internal only Yes
5. Do you require the use of any 
specific models, tools or methods 
when a NRA is conducted?
No. 
Recommend 
FSA; 
ANATEC’s 
COLLRISK 
model 
commonly 
used by most 
often  by 
developers to 
compare base 
case vs. 
future case 
risk. 
Yes. German 
Hazardous 
Incident 
Ordinance 
(Störfallveror
dnung), the 
British Safety 
Case 
Regulations 
for offshore 
installations, 
IMO 
regulations 
for risk 
assessment to 
be followed. 
Models from 
GL (DNV-
GL) most 
commonly 
used by 
developers to 
compare base 
case vs. 
future case 
risk.
No. 
Recommend 
FSA; 
DNV 
MARCS 
model, and 
models from 
COWI and 
Rambøll 
most 
commonly 
used by 
developers to 
compare base 
case vs. 
future case 
risk.
No. 
Recommend 
FSA; 
MARIN’s 
SAMSON 
model used 
most 
commonly to 
compare base 
case vs. 
future case 
risk.
No.
Recommend 
FSA; 
MARIN’s 
SAMSON 
model used 
most 
commonly to 
compare base 
case vs. 
future case 
risk
No. 
Recommend 
IALA’s 
iWRAP-
MKII model; 
SSPA model 
most 
commonly 
used by 
developers to 
compare base 
case vs. 
future case 
risk.
No. 
Recommend 
‘What-if’ 
analysis 
amongst 
other tools.
6. Is there a minimum standard of 
consequence assessment? For 
instance, do you require the 
consequences of accidents to be 
modelled qualitatively, 
quantitatively, analytically, 
empirically, numerically? 
No. Just 
require 
comparison 
of base case 
vs. future 
case risk.
Yes. 
developers 
do need to 
show that 
turbines are 
collision-
friendly for a 
specific 
vessel 
drifting at 2 
m/s, using 
FEA
No. Just require comparison of base case vs. future case risk.
*In DK, developers do need to show that turbines are collision-friendly, though this 
can be qualitatively
7. Is there a minimum standard of 
probability assessment? For 
instance, do you require the 
consequences of accidents to be 
modelled analytically, empirically, 
numerically? 
No. Just 
require 
comparison 
of base case 
vs. future 
case risk.
Yes. 
Numerical 
calculation 
required.
No. Just require comparison of base case vs. future case risk.
8. Are there any specific factors that 
must be considered in a NRA –
e.g. – specific ship type, size, 
speed, weather conditions, etc.?
Ship traffic, speeds and types through AIS data, dynamic (wind, wave, tides, currents, etc.) and static (bathymetry, 
hydrographic features, layout of channels, etc.) environmental conditions, OWF location and layout 
9. Are there any guidelines for 
approving a wind farm with 
regards to navigation safety? 
No. Case-by-
case basis.
Yes. 
Minimum 
100 year 
return period; 
turbine must 
be collision 
friendly, and 
not rupture 
hull of a pre-
determined 
No. Case-by-case basis.
*In DK, turbine must be collision friendly. 
vessel 
drifting in to 
it at 2m/s
Similar answers for each question are coloured green and discrepant answers are orange
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authorities. The NRA also does not cover the decommissioning phase of an
OWF’s life cycle.
The guidance documents from the UK recommend that developers follow the
five-step Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) methodology (IMO 2002). FSA—which
has also been adapted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)—allows
decision makers (in this case, the licensing and approval authorities MMO and
MCA) to evaluate the risks, costs and benefits of a proposed activity or system and
to propose adequate risk-control options, making it ideally suited for a process such
as NRA.
Within the FSA methodology, users are free to choose which models and tools they
want to use for probability and consequence calculations. In the UK, there are no
minimum requirements as to whether these models or tools should be qualitative,
quantitative, numerical, empirical, probabilistic, deterministic, etc. Thus, even though
the two guidance documents cited above (MCA 2013, 2016) mention possible use of
numerical models and simulations, OWF developers are not obliged to use and adhere
to these specifically—and are free to use any models or tools for probability or
consequence calculations that they deem fit.
A cursory look on the National Infrastructure Planning Portal (NIP 2017), which
contains environmental impact assessment (EIA) and NRA studies for various UK-
based OWFs, indicates that nearly all developers5 use the COLLRISK model from
Anatec UK Ltd. (Anatec 2017). This quantitative, probabilistic model primarily relies
on vessel traffic data to estimate the difference in risk of navigational accidents in an
5 In all ten OWF NRA documents reviewed by authors, the COLLRISK model was used.
Table 4 Comparison of the scope of the NRA process in the s countries
UK DE DK NL BE SE US
10. Which of the following maritime 
operations are considered during a 
NRA in your country? 
a. Passing vessels Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
b. Support vessel 
operations
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
c. OWF Installation 
Operations
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
d. OWF 
Decommissioning 
Operation
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
e. Emergency 
Operations including 
Search & Rescue 
(SAR)
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
f. Operations in ports & 
harbours that deal 
with OWF activities 
No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
11. Which phases of a OWF’s 
lifecycle are covered by the NRA 
in your country?
a. Installation & Cable 
Laying
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
b. Operation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
c. Decommissioning No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Phases and processes covered by NRA are in green; those not covered by NRA in a country are in orange
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area before and after an OWF is constructed. The COLLRISK model also uses
estimates of impact energy (using kinetic energy formulae), as well as past accident
statistics, to predict the probability and level of consequences, such as loss of life,
injuries or environmental damage.
Nevertheless, the adequacy of a NRA in the UK is determined on a strictly case-by-
case basis. Therefore, developers should be able to demonstrate that they have consid-
ered all listed factors thoroughly, whilst giving reasonable justification for the methods,
models and tools that they have used.
Similarly, each OWF in the UK is also approved on a case-by-case basis, which
means that there are no specific limits on how low the probability and/or consequences
of OWF-related navigational accidents should be. In other words, the ‘acceptable’ risk
limits for each OWF can be different—and whether an OWF gets the go ahead is
decided on the outcome of the NRA, which includes the results of hazard identification
(HAZID) workshops (wherein the risks are identified), a formal risk assessment and
comparison of base and future case risks, and the discussions of stakeholder consulta-
tions (wherein risk identification, analysis and control options are discussed).
4.1.2 Germany
Germany has the second-largest COWC after the UK, with 947 installed OWTs as of
2016. There has been a flurry of OWF-related activities in Germany over the last two
years in particular: of the 4108 MW total COWC, 2282 MW worth of turbines were
installed in 2015 alone—with a further 813 MW installed in 2016.
In Germany, the licensing of all OWFs in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is
done by the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency of Germany (Bundesamt für
Seeschifffahrt und Hydrographie, or BSH). The NRA is a part of the licensing process,
and is checked by the Directorate-General for Waterways and Navigation6
(Generaldirektion Wasserstraßen und Schifffahrt, or GDWS).
Some of the early (and already quite comprehensive) documents for OWF NRA
were developed by the class-society Germanischer Lloyd more than 15 years ago (GL
2002) and updated nearly a decade ago (GL 2008). Subsequently, some of the early
NRA studies used models developed by GL such as COLWT (GL 2002, 2008; Ellis
et al. 2008). In more recent years, updated NRA guidance documents have been
produced by federal authorities in Germany. The BSH, for instance, has developed a
construction standard for OWFs—‘Minimum requirements concerning the constructive
design of offshore structures within the Exclusive Economic Zone’ (BSH 2015)—
which provides an overview of the risk assessment process, as well as details about
accident-consequence estimation. This document is used in combination with ‘AG-
Richtwerte’—a document developed by GDWS—which provides guidelines for prob-
ability assessment (in German). Other relevant documents7 containing guidance on
NRA include an implementing directive on marine impacts of OWFs (BMVI 2014a); a
6 GDWS itself has 39 waterways and shipping offices, as well as 7 waterway construction offices. Both the
BSH and GDWS are a part of the Waterways & Shipping Administrations of the Federal Government
(Wasserstraßen- und Schifffahrtsverwaltung des Bundes, or WSV). The WSV is one of 9 directorates of the
Federal Ministry of Transport & Digital Infrastructure (Bundesministeriums für Verkehr und digitale
Infrastruktur, or BMVI).
7 The other aforementioned documents are available in German only.
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safety framework for OWFs (BMVI 2014b); a framework to ensure the proper
implementation of traffic regulations in the vicinity of OWFs, including guidance on
marking of offshore turbines (GDWS 2014a); and a directive to ensure the safety and
security of ship traffic in the vicinity of OWFs (GDWS 2014b). These documents list
the factors that need to be considered during NRAs (e.g. vessel traffic; OWF location
and layout; environmental conditions including wind, weather, ice, fog, bathymetry,
effect on navigational equipment, etc.)—and also identify important stakeholders that
should be consulted during the process (e.g. GDWS, German Sailing Association,
fisheries associations, etc.). The factors and the stakeholders which are considered
during a NRA are similar in both the UK and Germany, and were confirmed by the
German respondents in their survey responses during the present study.
The focus of NRAs in Germany is primarily on assessing and managing the impact
of OWFs on passing shipping traffic. WSV operations, installation and
decommissioning operations, emergency response operations and operations in ports
and harbours are not explicitly dealt with during the NRA process. A NRA in Germany
covers all phases of an OWF’s life cycle, including installation and cable laying,
operation and decommissioning.
The guidance documents by BSH clearly state that ‘the method of risk classification
and analysis shall be based on the German Hazardous Incident Ordinance
(Störfallverordnung), the British Safety Case Regulations for offshore installations
and the IMO regulations’ (BSH 2015).
In Germany, the probability of navigational accidents must be calculated numeri-
cally whilst accounting for factors such as ship type, size, speed, weather conditions,
location and layout of OWF, etc.; the GDWS provides inputs on which ship types and
sizes need to be considered. Once the probability of a navigational accident is calcu-
lated, it can be categorized within a qualitative band (frequent, occasionally, rare,
extremely rare) as per the guidance of BSH ( 2015). The emphasis in Germany is more
on vessel-turbine collisions than on vessel-vessel collisions or vessel groundings which
may also be caused by an OWF restricting navigable space. A BMVI working group
has deemed that there should not be more than one OWF-related navigational accident
every 100 years; any frequency higher than this is considered unacceptable. This is a
very different approach than that of the UK, where the so-called return period of vessel-
turbine accidents (i.e. the minimum number of years between accidents) is determined
on a case-by-case basis rather than a fixed, generic value. It is also interesting to note
the requirement for a numerical probability calculation—which is again in stark
contrast with the UK where there are no minimum model- or tool-related obligations
on developers.
Furthermore, the focus on consequence assessment is also more detailed and explicit
in Germany than in the UK and most other countries. Developers are required to use
finite-element (FE) simulation programmes to model an accident between a turbine and
a reference vessel(s). Developers are, however, free to choose their preferred software
package and modelling tools for the FE calculations. Examples of FE analyses of ship-
turbine collisions can be found in the works of Biehl and Lehmann (2006), Le Sourne
et al. (2015) and Bela et al. (2017) amongst many others as listed by Mehdi and
Schröder-Hinrichs (2016) and Deeb et al. (2017).
The purpose of the FE calculations is to understand the behaviour of turbine collapse
and to ensure that the support structure of an OWT is ‘collision friendly’—i.e. ‘if an
410 Mehdi et al.
offshore wind turbine, as a consequence of collision, does not fall onto the ship, the
ship remains floatable and there is no leakage of pollutants’ (BSH 2015). In other
words, a turbine must not rupture the hull of a ship under specified conditions; the
conditions are specified by the BMVI and assume that a reference ship, of a given type
and structural configuration, drifts into the turbine at a speed of 2 m/s. The BSH ( 2015)
guidance lists further specific criteria that must be met during the FE calculation stages,
including a list of acceptable assumptions for the model.
Ideally, several different scenarios should be modelled using FE calculations.
Following the FE calculations, qualitative consequence levels (catastrophic, serious,
significant, insignificant) are assigned to each scenario based on the expected condition
of the OWT, the expected damage to the ship, the expected environmental damage and/
or the expected casualties and fatalities. Developers are then required to use a risk
matrix to ‘combine’ the consequence and probability levels into a given risk value for
each scenario. The combined risk value for each scenario must be below a certain
threshold to be acceptable, as specified by BSH ( 2015).
Traditionally speaking, there has been widespread use of Germanischer Llloyd’s
(now DNV-GL) collision models in Germany, who also provided input for NRA
guidelines in the country. The package LS-DYNA has also been widely used to
conduct FE modelling of vessel-turbine collisions. As mentioned above, however,
developers are free to choose the models for both probability and consequence
assessments.
Compared to other countries, Germany has opted for a more rigid approach to NRA.
The lack of flexibility, however, does offer certain apparent advantages in terms of
standardization, transparency and harmonization. Whether this approach is more or less
effective than that of other countries remains to be seen.
4.1.3 Denmark
Denmark is truly a pioneering country when it comes to offshore wind energy. The
first-ever OWF, Vindeby, was commissioned near Lolland in Denmark, in 1991. And
after producing 243 GWh of energy over 25 years, Vindeby is finally being
decommissioned. The legacy of offshore wind, however, remains strong in Denmark,
where there are currently 517 installed OWTs, with a COWC of 1271 MW. This year,
the Danish Energy Agency (DEA) produced a report detailing the Danish experiences
of OWFs (DEA 2017).
The licensing of OWFs is handled by the DEA. Developers are required to conduct
an EIA for each OWF, and a crucial part of this EIA is the NRA. The NRA is checked
and validated by the Danish Maritime Authority (DMA).
While the DMA has internal guidelines on NRA, there are no specific public
documents providing guidance on the topic. Nevertheless, the in-depth interview with
the Danish authorities provided a thorough insight into the NRA process. The factors
and stakeholders that are considered in Denmark are very similar to those that are
considered in the UK or Germany. The factors that are considered during a NRA
include vessel traffic data, ship routes, OWF-related data, effect of turbines on naviga-
tional equipment, and static and dynamic environmental conditions, as well as the
presence of existing risk-control options such as vessel traffic service (VTS) or traffic
separation schemes (TSS). The Danish authorities explicitly listed pilots, VTS
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operators, local port authorities, fishermen, leisure boat owners and operators as well as
leisure ports as important stakeholders. The list of both factors and stakeholders is non-
exhaustive, as stated by the interview respondents.
In Denmark, the NRA covers all maritime operations, including passing vessels,
WSV operations, OWF installation and decommissioning operations, emergency re-
sponse operations and even operations in ports and harbours that deal with OWF
activities. The NRA also covers all phases of an OWF’s life cycle, including installation
and cable laying, operation and decommissioning.
The DMA—like the British MCA—strongly recommends the use of FSA as the
overarching method for NRA. Developers can opt for a different method with reason-
able justification, but generally comply with DMA’s recommendation. As in the UK,
developers are free to choose which models and tools they use for probability and
consequence assessment stages within the FSA. There are no minimum requirements as
to whether probability and/or consequence assessments need to be qualitative, quanti-
tative, numerical, probabilistic, etc.
Generally, however, the starting point of a NRA in Denmark is the consideration of
current and predicted AIS data to quantitatively estimate the probability of navigational
accidents for different vessel types in the vicinity of OWFs. This estimation should
account for the various factors listed above, such as vessel traffic, OWF location and
layout, configuration of shipping routes and environmental conditions. If the return
period is found to be too low, then developers need to demonstrate that they will
implement adequate risk-control measures—particularly to mitigate the consequences
of navigational accidents. This discussion is usually a part of HAZID workshops.
There are no strict demands in terms of consequence assessment either—and
certainly no requirements for FE calculations like in Germany. That being said, the
turbines do need to be collision friendly, but this is something that is generally
addressed qualitatively during discussions in HAZID workshops.
In previous years, OWF developers in Denmark have often made use of Det Norske
Veritas’ (DNV’s) ‘Marine Accident Risk Calculation System’ (MARCS) model (Ellis
et al. 2008). This model combines AIS data with OWF location and layout to assess the
frequency of accidents before and after an OWF is installed. The model also has the
capability to estimate the probability and level of consequences, and can provide a
rough assessment of environmental damage through probabilistic damage calculations.
This detail of consequence assessment may not be needed for qualitative discussions,
but it is nevertheless a good option to have. In more recent years, companies such as
COWI and Rambøll have also conducted NRAs for OWFs in Denmark.
Each OWF in Denmark is approved on a case-by-case basis—and thus, there are no
generic requirements about how low the probability or consequences need to be. If the
accident return period is too low, then the approval of an OWF may hinge on adequate
risk-control options being implemented; these measures may seek to reduce to proba-
bility or, more often, the consequences of navigational accidents associated with
OWFs. Measures include re-routing of shipping lanes to increase safe space for ships,
marking and nautical aids, proper marking on charts and collision-friendly wind turbine
design in case of accidents.
Overall, the approach of Denmark towards NRA follows more closely the approach
of the UK rather than that of Germany. That being said, the requirements for turbines to
be collision friendly is an idea championed by Germany more so than the UK.
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4.1.4 The Netherlands
The Netherlands is another pioneering country when it comes to wind energy. The very
mention of the nation evokes images of quaint, centuries-old windmills in fields of
tulips. It is therefore apt to see that the Netherlands has a strong OWF sector as well. As
of 2016, there are 365 OWTs with a COWC of 1118 MW in the Netherlands.8
The licensing of OWFs in the Netherlands falls under the ‘Kavelbesluiten’ (part of
the Act on offshore wind energy), and also relates to the Water Act. The Water Act also
provides the general rules for all OWFs within the EEZ. The authority responsible for
the licensing of OWFs is the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy
(MEACP), which makes decisions in liaison with other federal authorities such as
the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (MIW)9; the Netherlands Enter-
prise Agency (RVO.nl) executes the SDE+ (in Dutch: Stimulering Duurzame
Energieproductie) operating grant, offshore wind energy subsidy and permit tenders
on behalf of MEACP.
The Dutch government itself is responsible for producing an EIA, called a marine
environmental effects report (MER), as well as the NRA. The MER and NRA are then
passed on to the developers, along with specific design requirements for potential OWFs.
Rijkswaterstaat, the part of the Ministry of Infrastructure andWater Management (MIW)
that is responsible for the design, construction, management and maintenance of themain
infrastructure facilities, is responsible for conducting the NRA and verifying that devel-
opers comply with the NRA findings. The approach of the Dutch authorities towards the
NRA thus differs from that of the other coastal states covered in this study. While the
other coastal states require the OWF developers to conduct NRAs and EIAs, these
processes are led and conducted by the governmental authorities in the Netherlands.
This means that in other coastal states, the NRA is generally a part of the approval and
licensing stages only—whereas in the Netherlands, the NRA is the same across the
planning, approval and licensing stages. This has the added advantage of ensuring that
there are minimal differences between OWFs-as-planned and OWFs-as-approved.
There are publicly available guidelines pertaining to safe navigation around OWFs.
Most of the documents,10 however, are in Dutch. This includes the important ‘Bijlage
4: Reglementen, voorschriften en verkeersregels voor scheepvaart die’—an appendix
which deals with rules and regulations of shipping traffic, with a particular focus on
safe-passing distances to OWFs. An equivalent and comprehensive document is also
available in English (MIE and MEA 2014). The latter document lists the factors and
8 These numbers, cited by WindEurope, differ to the official Dutch figures of 289 offshore turbines and
957 MW COWC. The discrepancy is because WindEurope includes the turbines at Lake Ijsselmeer, whereas
the Dutch authorities do not. For the purposes of this report, the Dutch figures are more accurate as ‘offshore’
turbines are those beyond the defined marine baseline of a country, where the baseline is defined as per
UNCLOS. For reasons of consistency however, the figures from WindEurope are cited in the text.
9 Following the Dutch general elections in March 2017, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
(MIE) is now called the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (MIW). The spatial department of
the old Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment is now part of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
The old Ministry of Economic Affairs is now called the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy.
Note that the former Ministry of Economic Affairs was also responsible for MPA policy and fisheries. These
task are now in our new Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food quality.
10 Available from www.noordzeeloket.nl
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stakeholders that are taken into consideration when discussing safety of navigation.
Factors which are taken into account include vessel traffic characteristics, ship speed,
sizes and manoeuvrability, static and dynamic environmental conditions, and OWF
layout and location. Important stakeholders for NRA—as listed by the interview
respondent—include, but are not limited to, the OWF sector, commercial and recrea-
tional shipping, fishermen, harbour authorities and various governmental departments.
It is apparent that the factors and stakeholders considered during a NRA in the
Netherlands are similar to those considered during NRAs in other countries such as
the UK, Germany and Denmark.
In the Netherlands, a NRA should cover all maritime operations, including passing
vessels, WSV operations, OWF installation and decommissioning operations, emer-
gency operations, as well as operations in ports and harbours that deal with OWF
activities. The NRA also covers all phases of an OWF’s life cycle from installation,
through operation, to decommissioning.
A NRA in the Netherlands can be conducted for two purposes related to OWFs. The
first purpose is proposal of risk-control measures (e.g. new routing measures) around
existing OWFs. For this purpose, the NRA is conducted by the Dutch authorities and
submitted to the IMO. The IMO-recommended FSA methodology (IMO 2012) is
followed for such submissions—and authorities prefer to use the quantitative ‘Safety
Assessment Models for Shipping and Offshore in the North Sea’ (SAMSON) model
(van der Tak 2010; Ellis et al. 2008), developed by the Marine Research Institute of the
Netherlands (MARIN), for the probability and consequence calculation stages in the
FSA. When proposing routing measures, the Dutch authorities follow the guidelines of
the World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure (PIANC) with regard to
minimum waterway width, and also rely on the results from the research institute
MARIN which have determined how much space is needed between waterways and
OWF boundaries. Using an NRA to re-route shipping lanes around existing OWFs is
an unprecedented action that was taken by the Netherlands, as normally, in other coastal
states, shipping lanes are re-routed before OWFs have been built, in anticipation, often
during planning and/or scoping stages. Nevertheless, it is a positive step to ensure
navigational safety, and set a good example for other coastal states to follow, in case
they ever recognize the need to retroactively adopt their risk-control measures, due to
changes in shipping traffic and/or environmental conditions for instance.
The second purpose of an NRA is the approval of OWFs (which is common
across the other coastal states). In this case, a NRA is used to compare base-case
with future-case scenarios, and is conducted by MIW and Rijkswaterstaat. As
mentioned earlier, the results of the NRA (as well the overarching MER) are
presented to developers, along with specific design specifications for potential wind
farms. The federal authorities (i.e. MIW and Rijkswaterstaat) are then responsible
for ensuring that developers adhere to the guidelines during the approval and
licensing phase. The Dutch authorities prefer to follow the FSA methodology,
and favor the use of MARIN’s quantitative SAMSON model for probability and
consequence calculations11 for OWF-approval NRAs as well.
11 Whilst Denmark and the UK also advocate the use of the FSA methodology for NRA, they do not have any
particular recommendations as to which models should be used for probability and consequences calculations
within the FSA.
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SAMSON, like most other commercial models, relies on AIS data to calculate the
risk of navigational accidents in the vicinity of OWFs. It can be used to calculate and
compare the probability and consequences of navigational accidents for various base-
case (i.e. no OWF) and future-case (i.e. OWFs in different layouts/locations) scenar-
ios. When calculating the probability of drifting or powered accidents near OWFs,
SAMSON can account for various specific factors such as ship types, sizes and
speeds, effect of OWTs on ships’ navigational equipment, as well as static and
dynamic environmental factors—not to mention risk-control options such as VTS,
TSS, availability of tugs in an area, etc. SAMSON also performs quantitative
consequence assessment, and can be used to predict the damage to turbines and
ships, environmental damage in terms of oil spills or human casualties through the use
of complex semi-analytical/empirical formulae. Furthermore, SAMSON is also able to
assess the economic- and efficiency-cost of various risk-control options (e.g. re-
routing), which makes it a good tool for cost-benefit analyses—and an ideal comple-
ment to the FSA methodology. Despite all the positives, however, SAMSON is a
commercial tool, which means that certain elements within it may not be entirely
transparent to the general public.
It is important to reiterate that the use of SAMSON is highly recommended, but not
obligatory. Whilst most OWF developers—and the Dutch authorities themselves—use
SAMSON, it is possible to employ other models and tools for OWF NRA, with
reasonable justification.
Like in Denmark, or the UK, OWFs in the Netherlands are approved on a case-by-
case basis. Each individual NRA is generally discussed with operational end users
(including seafarers, fishermen, recreational sailors) and nautical policy experts before
being presented to OWF developers, and before licenses can be granted.
The Dutch approach to NRA is quite comprehensive and well-established. In terms
of flexibility, it is not quite as flexible as that of the UK, but is certainly more on par
with Germany’s approach. Aside from ‘traditional’ NRAs, the consideration of ship
manoeuvrability and minimum waterway width are factors which the Dutch have
pursued more vigorously than other countries, in order to ensure that their sea space
is used as safely and efficiently as possible. This is certainly an approach that can
certainly be better integrated within NRA processes in other coastal states.
4.1.5 Belgium
Bordering two OWF ‘giants’—the UK to the West and the Netherlands to the North—
Belgium also has some serious ambitions of its own when it comes to offshore wind.
Despite only having a coastline of approximately 67 km, Belgium has a COWC of
712 MW, which places it at the sixth rank globally. Currently, 182 OWTs are installed
off the coast of Belgium—and the Belgium government has given approval for four
more OWFs to be built in the future.
OWFs in Belgium need an environmental license which is granted by the Ministry
of Public Health and Environment. The NRA is a part of this environmental license and
is conducted by the OWF developer. The NRA is checked by Directorate-General
Shipping, which is a part of the Federal Ministry of Transport, as well as by the Agency
for Maritime and Coastal Affairs from the Flemish Region, who are responsible for
pilotage and VTS in the whole of Belgium.
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The factors and stakeholders which are considered during a NRA in Belgium are
very similar to those that are considered in other countries. There are particular
similarities between the NRA process in Belgium and the Netherlands. Factors which
are taken into consideration during a NRA in Belgium include, but are not limited to,
vessel traffic, static and dynamic environmental conditions, and OWF-related informa-
tion such as the location and layout of OWTs. Stakeholders who are consulted during a
NRA in Belgium include seafarers and pilots, port and harbour authorities, ship owners,
VTS operators and end users involved in emergency maritime operations, such as
search and rescue (SAR).
A NRA in Belgium covers most maritime operations, including passing shipping
traffic, WSV operations, installation and decommissioning operations, and emergency
operations including SAR. Operations in ports and harbours that deal with OWF
activities, however, are not covered as part of the NRA. The NRA only covers the
installation and operation phases of an OWF, and not the decommissioning phase.
Belgian authorities do not require OWF developers to follow any specific methods
for the NRA. They do, however, recommend the use of IMO’s FSA framework, and
MARIN’s SAMSON model—although developers can opt for other models and tools
with reasonable justification as well.12 Regardless of which model they use, at the very
minimum, OWF developers should be able to demonstrate that they have assessed the
probability of navigational accidents quantitatively. This requires a comparison of base-
case and future-case scenarios, with and without an OWF, whilst accounting for factors
such as vessel traffic, shipping routes, effect of OWTs on navigational equipment,
weather conditions, hydrographic features, existing risk-control options and OWF
layouts. Belgian authorities are particularly interested in the frequency of accidents
before and after an OWF is installed, and base their decision heavily on this parameter,
which is why they recommend a model like SAMSON.
There are no specific requirements with regard to consequence assessment in
Belgium either—but it is strongly recommended that developers conduct quantitative
probabilistic assessments which can estimate the likelihood and level of consequences
in terms such as potential ship damage, expected OWF downtime, potential environ-
mental damage and possible human casualties. Such quantitative consequence assess-
ment can be conducted through SAMSON, if that model is being used.
Each OWF has its own specific impact on navigation, and subsequently, each NRA
is judged on a case-by-case basis. There are no generic guidelines on how low the
probability and/or consequences of navigational accidents need to be, and the accept-
ability criteria are determined on the back of the NRA and stakeholder consultations.
The Belgian approach to NRA is quite similar to the Dutch approach, which–given
their shared borders, and close proximity of OWFs—works out very well according to
the respondents from both Belgium and the Netherlands. Recently, Belgium and the
Netherlands even submitted a joint FSA to the IMO to implement certain joint routing
measures that would mitigate the risk of navigational accidents in the vicinity of OWFs.
Despite the fact that Belgian authorities opt for 500 m safety distance between their
shipping lanes and OWFs, whilst the Dutch opt for at least 1.87 NM, the joint proposal
was quite a success. Although they may have different views of how ‘safe’ a system is,
or what the acceptable distance between a shipping lane and an OWF should be, they
12 Early NRA studies in Belgium have utilized models from DNV (MARCS) and GL (COLWT).
416 Mehdi et al.
nonetheless have very similar, comparable NRA processes. Their joint approach is thus
a perfect example that if countries wish to harmonize their NRAs, they can do so—and
still have different opinions and acceptability criteria when it comes to navigational
risk.
4.1.6 Sweden
Sweden can be classified as an ‘emerging’ nation when it comes to offshore wind
energy generation. With just 86 installed OWTs, the Sweden has a COWC of 202 MW.
Nevertheless, Sweden has ambitions to generate around 10 TWh of energy from
offshore wind by the year 2020.
A NRA is necessary for OWFs in Sweden (BalticMaster 2007), where the licensing
for such installations is carried out by the Environmental Court. The NRA is normally
then checked by the Swedish Maritime Administration (Sjöfartsverket, or SMA for
short) as well as the Swedish Transport Agency (Transportstyrelsen, or STA for short).
Despite being an ‘emerging’ nation in terms of offshore wind, Sweden has produced
several comprehensive documents related to OWF NRA. The work of Ellis et al.
(2008), for instance, was conducted to provide input for the Swedish NRA process.
Following this work, a brief guidance document was produced by the governmental
authorities (SMA and STA 2009). More recently, the Swedish Energy Agency
(Energimyndigheten, or SEA for short), together with other relevant stakeholders such
as SMA and STA, produced guidelines on health and safety issues related to OWFs
(SEA 2014). Part of this guidance refers to safe navigation of vessels in the vicinity of
OWFs. The factors and stakeholders which are considered during a NRA in Sweden are
similar to those considered in other countries. The aforementioned documents identify
vessel traffic, dynamic and static environmental conditions, OWF layout and location,
and existing risk-control options including VTS, TSS, etc. as some of the factors that
need to be considered during a NRA. When asked about the stakeholders, the interview
respondents listed SMA, STA, the Environmental Court, Länsstyrelserna (county
administrative boards), Havs- och Vattenmyndigheten (Swedish Agency for Marine
and Water Management—SwAM) and various environmental organizations as some of
the parties that need to be consulted during a NRA.
A NRA in Sweden should ideally assess the risk to all maritime operations
including the risk to passing shipping traffic, the risk during WSV operations, the
risk during OWF installation and decommissioning operations, the risk during
emergency operations such as SAR in the vicinity of OWFs and even the risk
during port and harbour operations related to OWFs. Subsequently a NRA should
also be valid for the all phases of an OWF’s life cycle—from installation, through
operation, to decommissioning.
In Sweden, OWF developers are not required to use any specific models or methods
for OWF NRA. That being said, the guidance document produced by SEA ( 2014)
mentions the tool iWRAP-MK-II, which was developed by the International Associa-
tion of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA). Traditionally, however, tools and models
developed by the maritime consultancy SSPA (Ellis et al. 2008) are more commonly
used for OWF NRA in Sweden than iWRAP; this is unsurprising considering that
SSPA has played a major role in developing some of the guidelines related to OWF
NRA in Sweden. SSPA’s model for NRA is very similar to those developed by DNV,
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GL or MARIN—and also relies primarily on AIS data. Amongst other factors, the
SSPA model takes into account vessel sizes and speeds, condition of the vessel
(powered or drifting), layout of shipping routes, static and dynamic environmental
conditions, OWF location and layout, and availability of risk-control options such as
VTS, TSS or tugs, etc. Through this information, the model can quantitatively predict
the probability of various navigational accidents in a given sea area both before and
after an OWF is built. This information can also be combined with accident statistics to
empirically quantify the probability and level of consequences.
Although it may not yet be a major OWF player, the existing NRA processes in
Sweden reflect the country’s ambitions for the future. Truly, Sweden is taking a
proactive stance towards safety of navigation around OWFs.
4.1.7 United States of America
The last country considered in the present study is the US. The US, like Sweden, can be
classified as an ‘emerging’ nation in terms of offshore wind energy generation. As of
2016, there is only one commercial OWF in the US—the five-turbine Block Island Wind
Farm—giving the US a COWC of 30MW. Yet, the US has great potential for OWF given
their enormous coastlines along the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, the Gulf Coast, the
coast of Alaska, the Hawaii archipelago and the coasts of many of their outlying territories.
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) is responsible for the licensing
of all offshore renewable energy installations (OREIs) beyond 3 NM state waters;
within the 3-NM limit, licensing of OWFs and other OREIs falls under the mandate of
the US Army Corps of Engineers. A NRA is not required by law in either regime, but is
generally included as part of the broader Environmental Review. The United States
Coast Guard (USCG) is normally asked to weigh in on the NRA submissions.
Despite their late entry into the offshore wind sector, the US also has comprehensive
documents with regard to NRA. In particular, the USCG has developed a thorough and
comprehensive document pertaining to OREI NRA (USCG 2007). The document lists
various factors—such as vessel traffic, ship types and sizes, waterway characteristics
and static and dynamic environmental conditions including wind, waves, current and
ice that should, amongst others, be accounted for during a NRA. The document also
lists various stakeholders that need to be consulted during the NRA process. On a
personal level, the interview respondent identified commercial seafarers, fishermen,
recreational boaters, tug and barge operators, and various commercial shipping com-
panies as important stakeholders to consider during the NRA. It is quite evident that the
factors and stakeholders considered during a NRA in the US are similar to those
considered in the other countries in the present study.
Developers in the US are encouraged to produce NRAs that assess the risk to all
types of maritime operations—from passing vessel operations to WVS and installation
and decommissioning vessel operations, as well as emergency maritime operations, and
operations in ports and harbours that deal with OWF activities. The NRA should cover
the installation and operation phases of an OWF’s life cycle, but there is no specific
requirement for a NRA to also cover the decommissioning phase.
As in several other countries, developers are not obliged or required to use any
specific method, model or tool for NRA. Even though the guidance developed by the
USCG mentions ‘what-if analysis’ as a tool, for example, it is simply a
418 Mehdi et al.
recommendation and not a requirement. Whilst there is no requirement to use any
specific tools, it is important for OWF developers to demonstrate that they have
considered all factors listed in the guidance document, some of which are mentioned
above. Developers are also required to demonstrate the effect that their installation can
have on the probability and consequences of navigational accidents, whilst accounting
for each of the listed factors. In other words, developers are required to compare the
base-case with possible future-case scenarios—a practice which is common in all of the
countries considered in the present study.
Each OWF in the US is approved on a case-by-case basis, and as such, there are no
generic guidelines about the probability or consequences being below a certain thresh-
old. Generally, a stakeholder consultation may discuss the NRA results and decide
whether the risks are acceptable or not.
It is encouraging to note that even the US, who only have 30 MW COWC, is
proactively addressing the navigational risk aspect of OWFs and OREIs.
4.2 Exploring the gaps in existing NRA processes
After describing the NRA process in their respective countries, the respondents were
asked to indicate their agreement with ten statements, as shown in Table 5. The
statements were derived through the literature review. By asking the respondents to
rate these statements in an interview setting, the goal was to establish whether or not
NRA experts (i.e. people who conduct or verify NRAs as part of their jobs) perceive
these weaknesses as well—and, furthermore, to elicit their opinions on how they might
wish to address these shortcomings.
4.2.1 Statements 1, 2 and 3—harmonization of NRA processes
One of the shortcomings identified by the literature review is a lack of harmonization
between the NRA processes of different countries. Statements 1, 2 and 3 in Table 5
relate to this particular concern. It is clear from both the literature review, and the
descriptions provided by the respondents themselves, that NRA processes are not the
same in different countries. The differences within the NRA processes of various
countries, however, are quite subtle for the most part; in fact, it is evident that there
are more similarities in the way that certain countries conduct NRAs. Belgium and the
Netherlands, for instance, both recommend the same model for probability and conse-
quence assessment; the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands all advocate the use of the
FSA methodology; and the factors and stakeholders which are consulted during a NRA
are identical across all the countries in the present study. Even the different commercial
models used for probability and consequence assessment have some similarities in
terms of calculation methods and input data—but subtle differences do exist, and may
lead to significantly different NRA results.
The similarities are nonetheless a positive indicator, because the respondents unani-
mously agree (or strongly agree) with statement 1—i.e. that the planning and approval of
OWFs can be improved by harmonizing the steps of the NRA process. In particular,
several of the respondents explicitly stated that having similar (or even the same)
probability and consequence calculation process would be immensely useful—especially
when it comes to transnational OWFs. This would help to avoid unexpected situations
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wherein the probability and consequences of navigational accidents are calculated
differently for the same OWF, as was the case with Krieger’s Flak—which is an OWF
that jointly lies in the EEZs of Sweden, Denmark and Germany (Ellis et al. 2008).
Table 5 Agreement ratings assigned to different statements by the respondents
5156 MW 4108 MW 1271 MW 1118 MW 712 MW 202 MW 30 MW
UK DE DK NL BE SE US
1. The planning/approval of
OWFs (especially
trans-national OWFs) can be
improved by harmonizing
the steps of the NRA pro-
cess in different countries
A A A SA SA A A
2. All countries should have the
same NRA process for
offshore wind farms
(OWFs)
A A A A A NAD NAD
3. A step-by-step best practice
guide for OWF NRA should
be produced by an intergov-
ernmental organization
(such as the IMO) to ensure
a harmonized NRA process
across different countries
A NAD NAD A A A NAD
4. There is a need to improve
the transparency of the NRA
process in terms of the
models and data that are
used
D NAD A A A A D
5. There is a need to improve
the input data that is used in
NRA frameworks, methods
and models
NAD NAD NAD A NAD A NAD
6. There is a need to improve
the models that are used
during the NRA process
D NAD NAD A D A NAD
7. There is a need to improve
the way through which
stakeholder feedback is
incorporated in the NRA
process
D NAD D NAD NAD A D
8. The is a need to improve the
communication between
maritime and offshore
energy stakeholders during
the NRA process
D NAD NAD D NAD A A
9. There is a need to improve
the communication of NRA
results to seafarers
D NAD D D SA NAD A
10. Seafarers that operate near
OWFs should be provided
with risk-based decision
support systems that allow
them to assess navigational
risk operationally
A NAD D D A NAD NAD
SA strongly agree, A agree, NAD neither agree nor disagree, D disagree, SD strongly disagree
420 Mehdi et al.
It should be mentioned that the two countries that ‘strongly agree’ with statement
1—BE and NL—already have a very harmonized process: they recommend the same
process and the use of the same model for probability and consequence calculations
(SAMSON)—and consider very similar factors and consult very similar stakeholders
during the NRA. These two countries have also made joint submissions to the IMO for
routing measures near their shared OWF boundaries. At the same time, they have
different views of risk-acceptability—e.g. how much safe distance should be main-
tained between an OWF boundary and a shipping route. Nonetheless, their experience
of harmonization seems very positive and mutually beneficial. As mentioned earlier,
this case clearly shows that harmonization can be achieved while still having different
opinions and risk-acceptance criteria.
Statement 2 did not garner the same unanimity as statement 1 from the respondents of
the two emerging OWF nations: while the respondents of the US and Sweden agree with
the need to harmonize steps within the NRA process, they are unsure about whether all
countries should have the exact same NRA process. Their primary concern is the
implementation challenge of such a measure. This is understandable from their point
of view: they do not currently have as much stake in offshore wind as other countries,
and for them, the bureaucratic burden of revamping their entire process to match the
others far outweighs the potential benefits; the Swedish respondents particularly view
having the same process as a generally unfeasible endeavour. These respondents also
feel that regional approaches might be better rather than international harmonization.
Nevertheless, the respondent from the US mentioned the potential benefits of having
‘international guidance’ that can augment the NRA process in the country.
This ties in with statement 3, which was designed to ask respondents about who
should take the lead for the harmonization of the NRA process—and whether it should
be a top-down initiative led by the IMO, for instance, or if a more bottom-up approach
led by various member states would be more preferable. The responses indicate a
preference for the top-down approach—with four of the seven respondents agreeing
and three indicating neutrality.
The respondents with a neutral stance on statement 3 have reservations about the
practicality of a top-down approach, and/or the ability of organizations like IMO to
push through such standards in a reasonable time. These reservations are not entirely
unfound either13: while IMO has pushed through globally accepted regulations, it is
undeniably true that this process can take a very long time; a good recent example of
this is the Ballast Water Management Convention—which took 14 years to just being
adopted in 2004, and another 13 years to finally enter into force in 2017. Furthermore,
there are many technical guidelines—e.g. on ship manoeuvrability standards, which are
still not ratified by all member states. Despite these shortcomings, IMO14 should strive
13 When the IMO started its work in 1958, initially, it was forced to develop international legal instruments
following a number of maritime accidents that occurred at that time. As a result, the early work of the IMO has
often been portrayed as more reactive in its nature. After almost 65 years of successful work allowing the
international legal instruments developed in IMO to demonstrate their positive effects, it is clear that this
approach has changed and IMO has adopted a more pro-active approach in respect to maritime safety.
14 The perceived ‘role’ of IMO is quite interesting when it comes to OWFs. A study by Gibson and Howsam
(2010), which plotted various stakeholders on an interest-influence graph placed IMO in the bottom-left
quadrant – i.e. IMO is perceived to have a low interest, and low influence in matters related to the approval of
OWFs.
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to work together with member states who have experience with OWFs, to publish
guidance documents on NRA. If done right, this would surely be welcomed by other
member states, as it could help to provide clarity and coherence in an age where
seascapes are increasingly cluttered.
Instead of opting for an international approach through IMO, an alternative approach
to statement 3 would be if member states with OWFs formed regional agreements to
harmonize their NRA processes. In fact, North Sea countries—who incidentally have
the most experience with OWFs—have just recently signed a political declaration15
that includes harmonization as of its core objectives. This provides a precedent for other
countries to undertake similar measures at a regional level.
4.2.2 Statements 4, 5 and 6—transparency and adequacy of models and input data
The second main shortcoming of NRA processes, as identified through the literature
review, is the apparent lack of transparency when it comes to the models and input data
that are used in these processes. The agreement ratings assigned to statements 4, 5 and
6 indicate a very split view of this perceived shortcoming. Unlike the harmonization
concern—where there was near unanimity—agreement towards this second shortcom-
ing seems to be influenced much more by the personal perceptions and opinions of the
individual respondents.
When asked whether there is a need to improve the transparency of models and
input data (statement 4), respondents from both the UK and US disagreed, the
respondents from Germany indicated neutrality, whilst the respondents from the other
4 countries agreed. Respondents from the UK and the US believe that their NRA
process is transparent enough – and that the models and input data which are used by
the respondents are openly available for scrutiny. Therefore, they do not see the need to
improve further—but nevertheless mention that they are open to suggestions for further
improvements. The transparency of the NRA process—in the UK particularly—is
undeniably exemplar: it is, for instance, quite easy to find correspondence between
the MCA (or other stakeholders) in the UK and the consultative bodies that perform
NRAs on behalf of OWF developers asking for clarification with certain aspects of the
models, input data or assumptions (NIP 2017).
It is also very encouraging to see that DK, NL, BE and SE themselves see the need
to improve the accessibility of their already-quite-transparent NRA processes. While
these other countries also strive for transparency, they are evidently not yet at the level
of the UK in this matter. Part of this may be due to the language ‘barrier’: NRA studies,
and even guidance documents, or documents describing the models and input data from
these countries are not always available in English (or not available at all); this means
that third-party interested stakeholders may have a harder time accessing and evaluating
these documents, or recreating and validating NRA results (Ellis et al. 2008). This is
not to say that all countries should conduct NRAs in English—but rather a request to
the authorities to ensure that at least the core documents are accessible by all stake-
holders. Shipping is truly a global industry, and while OWFs may be ‘locally’ placed,
they can have an influence on a much broader spectrum of stakeholders than just local
15 Political Declaration on energy cooperation between the North Seas Countries. Text available online via
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/
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folks. Most countries already issue ‘notices to mariners’ in English, and it would be
very helpful if documents describing NRA models were also made available in such a
manner to ensure a transparent process.
Statement 5 asked respondents if there is a need to improve the input data that is
used during the NRA process. While NL and SE indicated their agreement, five of
seven respondents indicated a neutral stance to statement 5. This statement is clearly
very hard to judge. As mentioned in the literature review section, OWFs are still a
‘new’ development—and a lot of the input data used for OWF NRA is merely
derivative from navigational risk studies for oil platforms, bridges, quays, piers and
other offshore installations. Even though OWFs have now been around for almost a
quarter of a century, and our understanding of the navigational risks associated with
such installation is much improved, there are still gaps in specific knowledge. The input
data used so far has been quite effective in helping to avert navigational accidents. At
the same time, as the respondents from Sweden highlighted, a lot of the data used in
NRA processes stem from accidents statistics—but there have not been enough
accidents to create a reliable dataset. This means it is still too early to say if our present
knowledge, assumptions and data are good enough, especially when considering the
predicted evolution of the offshore wind sector over the coming years and the possible
increased impact that this might have on navigational safety.
Due to this cyclical development, the respondents with a neutral outlook to state-
ment 5 appear to have opted for a cautious ‘time-will-tell’ attitude. Naturally, as the
offshore wind sector evolves, more and more data will also become available—which
will hopefully lead to an improved understanding of navigational risks associated with
OWFs. One can question, however, whether a ‘wait-and-see’ approach is prudent.
Powerful modelling tools and simulators—which incidentally are recommended, and
even used as part of the NRA process in the UK and NL—are becoming increasingly
common and feasible. Simulators can allow users to create ‘future-case’ scenarios and
explore navigational behaviour and challenges in a more proactive manner—giving
access to scenario-specific data and allowing the validity of assumptions to be thor-
oughly tested (Mehdi et al. 2017b). Approval authorities may thus benefit greatly by
advocating further use of such technology.
This leads us to statement 6—which asked respondents whether there is a need to
improve the models that are used to calculate the probability and consequences of
navigational accidents within the NRA processes. Statement 6 had quite polarized
responses—with NL and SE agreeing, UK and BE disagreeing, and the other three
countries opting for a neutral stance. The respondents who disagree with, or rate this
statement neutrally, are of the opinion that there is no need to improve the models
further, as the existing ones have done an adequate job at preventing navigational
accidents around OWFs; these respondents nevertheless indicated their openness to
new innovations, and stated that they would gladly adapt new models and tools, if they
were demonstrably better than the existing ones. Respondents from NL and SE opt for
a more proactive approach, and clearly state that they would like to continually improve
the models that they use during their NRAs—irrespective of whether or not there is a
need.
There is merit in both viewpoints. It is undoubtedly more effective and efficient for
all approval authorities and developers alike (in fact, for all stakeholders involved in
NRA) to stick with the tried-and-tested models. At the same time, the current and
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predicted evolution of the offshore wind sector serves as an ominous reminder against
complacency, and highlights the need to be proactive with NRA models: it is not
enough to have models that help to prevent accidents for now; NRA models should be
robust enough to allow for the safe and efficient planning of increasingly complex and
crowded marine areas in the future.
When discussing statement 6, it is also important to highlight that researchers have
developed, applied and validated some excellent tools and models (Deeb et al. 2017;
Mehdi and Schröder-Hinrichs 2016)—which definitely are on par with, if not better
than, some commercially available tools. Unfortunately, many of the research models
are underused in real-world applications. This is certainly not the fault of any particular
stakeholder group—approval authorities, for example, are very open to developers
using new tools and models as long as they are valid and comply with recommenda-
tions or guidelines; academics are eager to promote their work; and commercial
organizations are happy to work with research organizations in improving their own
models or collaboratively developing new ones. Why then is it that the maritime
industry always appears to be slow in adapting these state-of-the-art tools? There is
not a definitive answer, but respondents indicated that two factors may play a major
role: comfort and lack of awareness. Most OWF developers and consultative agencies
are comfortable using the most convenient and popular models—even if they do not
perform at the level of more complex models; it is also a hassle to continually use new
models instead of sticking with a ‘trusted’ one, which is also an understandable issue.
The lack of awareness, meanwhile, stems from the issue that sometimes researchers
often fail to show the value of their work (language barriers, publication barriers, poor
communication, etc.). Together, these two factors may be a reason why some cutting-
edge navigational models have not seen much use in industry yet.
4.2.3 Statements 7, 8, 9 and 10—stakeholder communication within the NRA process
The last possible shortcoming in the existing NRA process, as identified by the literature
review, pertains to stakeholder communication. Statement 7, therefore, directly asked the
respondents if there is a need to improve the way in which stakeholder feedback is
incorporated in the NRA process. Respondents from the UK, DK and US disagreed,
whilst the respondents from DE, NL and BE indicated their neutrality. Only the respon-
dents from SE agreed with this statement. The respondents who disagreed with this
statement were of the opinion that stakeholder consultations in their countries are already
quite robust, and pointed towards ample communication loops and workshops, wherein
stakeholders are encouraged to express their viewpoints. It was also pointed out that it
may be impossible to please all stakeholders—which might be why there are occasional
complaints about feedback not being taken into account. In reality, the comments from
each stakeholder are well-documented and thoroughly considered by the approval
authorities, and efforts are made to find the best possible compromise where necessary.
It is noteworthy that the respondents from SE agree with statement 7. The number of
agencies and stakeholders that are involved in the NRA in Sweden is comparatively
higher than other countries—and may explain this sentiment. This may mean it is more
difficult to incorporate stakeholder feedback compared to other countries. One can
expect, however, that as the offshore sector evolves in Sweden, so too will the
stakeholder consultation process.
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The respondents were also asked if there is a need to improve the commu-
nication between the maritime and offshore wind industry stakeholders, via
statement 8. This particular limitation of NRA processes cannot be explicitly
identified in any literature—but given the technical and specialized nature of
the NRA, and wind turbine/farm design processes, the authors wanted to
identify whether approval authorities would like to see more cooperation be-
tween the shipping and offshore wind industries. The researchers expected the
respondents to be polarized on this issue: it can be argued that the maritime
and offshore wind energy stakeholders only need to the know information that
is relevant to them—and not necessarily understand the intimate technical
details underlying each other’s work; on the other hand, one can also make
the case that a better mutual understanding of navigational risks and wind
turbine/farm design may lead to better cooperation amongst stakeholders, as
well as more effective use of sea space.
As expected, there was no unanimous agreement between the respondents on
statement 8. The respondents from the UK and NL disagreed with this statement,
and stated that they felt that the communication between these two groups of stake-
holders is adequate in their countries. Respondents from SE and the US, meanwhile,
agreed with statement 8—whilst respondents from the other three countries neither
agreed nor disagreed.
There was a very interesting discussion with the respondent from BE on statement 8.
Stakeholders from the energy industry often assume that ships only sail along well-
planned routes and follow routing measures as shown on spatial plans or nautical
charts, as shown in Fig. 1 for the Belgian EEZ. In reality, ships have absolute freedom
of navigation under UNCLOS16—and vessels, particularly fishing boats and pleasure
crafts, often also sail outside corridors that are reserved for shipping, as shown in Fig. 2
for the Belgian EEZ. In fact, some vessels may regularly sail in areas that are
specifically designated for OWFs on a spatial plan (where an OWF has yet to be
approved)—but developers may not realize this until they submit their plans for
approval because they are not familiar with maritime operations.
If an OWF is planned solely on the basis of nautical charts and spatial plans,
without due consideration of actual shipping traffic, it can lead to unwarranted
issues during the approval stages: in such scenarios, NRA studies may recom-
mend more stringent risk-control options than usual to mitigate the higher-than-
anticipated navigational risk. Such stringent safety measures can, in turn,
potentially reduce the efficiency of maritime operations, by—for instance—
forcing ships to take longer routes around OWFs; subsequently, these measures
may be seen as unwelcome cost burdens by maritime stakeholders. In some
cases, the OWF developers may also be required to pay more than they
anticipated for the implementation of risk-control options such as collision-
fenders, or markings and lightings on turbines. In extreme cases, OWFs may
have to be redesigned in the interest of navigational safety. In fact, the
respondent from BE highlighted a case where a row of turbines had to be
16 The exception to this is areas that are specifically designated as being mandatorily off limits for ships by a
coastal state and/or IMO; such areas are generally only enforceable after an OWF has been granted approval
or, in some cases, after the turbines have been installed.
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eliminated before the OWF was approved. This is clearly not an ideal situation
for OWF developers, nor for maritime stakeholders.
From the above discussion, it is apparent that while communication between
maritime and offshore wind energy stakeholders may be adequate during the approval
stages, this may not necessarily be the case during the planning stages. If—as recom-
mended by the respondent from BE in relation to statement 8—there is improved
communication between the two sectors during the planning stage as well, unexpected
and costly ‘surprises’ might be reduced during the subsequent approval process.
Statement 9 asked respondents if there is a need to improve the communication of
NRA results to operational end users who operate near OWFs—particularly seafarers.
Respondents from the UK, DK and NL disagree with this statement. They believe that
the NRA process—while open to feedback from seafarers—is not intended to provide
any information to seafarers, but is merely a tool for decision makers to approve or
deny the application for an OWF. The respondents for UK, DK and NL further point to
Fig. 1 Spatial plan of the Belgian EEZ. Source: authors
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the measures such as notice to mariners, which, they say, provide the relevant infor-
mation to operational end users including seafarers.
By contrast, the respondents from the US and BE agree and strongly agree with
statement 9. The respondent from BE particularly felt that the direct results of the
NRA process should be more open and accessible to seafarers—and that they
should not only be used as feedback providers. Belgium has quite a small, crowded
EEZ, which poses severe spatial challenges—so much so that authorities often
struggle to find adequate space between OWFs and shipping lanes. The respondent
from BE believes that seafarers being more aware of the direct results of NRAs is
therefore quite important.
It was mentioned earlier that a survey found seafarers who are aware of NRA
studies tend to be more concerned about navigational risks than seafarers who are
not (Mehdi et al. 2017a). One reason for this was suggested to be that seafarers are
asked for feedback, but not necessarily communicated the results of the NRA
process. In particular, some of the seafarers who were critical of the NRA process
stated:
& ‘I did not get results feedback’ [on an unidentified North Sea OWF]
& ‘Only aware of the study as it [sic…result] was not promulgated’ [on the London
Array]
& ‘I was deeply disappointed as I expressed my concerns and have not even been
contacted to explain reasons why my concerns where not addressed’ [on an OWF
near Liverpool—possibly Burbo Bank]
Fig. 2 Actual ship movements in the Belgian EEZ, mapped using AIS data. Source: EMSA (European
Maritime Safety Agency)
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The above statements from seafarers are perhaps a sign that the communication of
NRA results to seafarers does need be improved further.
This leads to statement 10, which asked the respondents if seafarers should be
provided with decision support tools when operating near OWFs. The respondent from
BE, unsurprisingly agreed with this statement—as did the respondent from the UK.
Respondents from DK and NL disagreed, while those from the other three countries
neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement.
The respondents that disagree with statement 10 cite their concerns that seafarers
may be overloaded with information; these respondents believe that prudent seafarers
already make adequate decisions by performing thorough situational awareness, and
that existing information provisions and tools are enough. Those that agree with
statement 10, meanwhile, say the seafarers need such information to operate near
OWFs safely—and that regardless of risk-control options, the ultimate barrier to
avoiding accidents are seafarers themselves. This latter group of respondents who
advocate the provision of decision-support tools and information say that seafarers
can use these tools if needed, or ignore it if they find them to be irrelevant. In other
words, it is better to ‘have’ and ‘not need’ than to ‘need’ and ‘not have’.
It is clear that the level of agreement towards statements 7, 8, 9 and 10 is also
significantly dependent on the personal perceptions of the various respondents—and
highlights the need for stakeholders (particular OWF approval and licensing authori-
ties) from different countries to come together, share their experiences and discuss these
issues which are not sufficiently addressed in existing works.
5 Conclusions
Through a literature review and an interview study, the present work summarizes the
NRA processes for OWFs in seven different countries. The interview study is also
novel in identifying potential shortcomings in these NRA processes. The respondents,
near-unanimously, agree that there needs to be harmonization between the NRA
processes of different countries. There is, however, little consensus on some of the
other issues, such as the transparency of models used for NRAs, or stakeholder
communication.
5.1 Recommendations
Based on the findings of the study, the authors present the following list of recommen-
dations and final thoughts:
5.1.1 Harmonization of NRA processes between countries, and within countries
between planning and approval stages
The NRA processes of different countries should be harmonized. In particular, the
calculation methods, factors and data sources used for probability and consequence
calculations should be similar, especially across countries in close proximity to each
other. This will help to avoid problems in approving transnational OWFs—and if done
right, encourage further growth of the offshore sector by reducing the bureaucratic
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burden on OWF developers. It would also reduce the chances of transnational OWFs
being approved in one country and being denied approval in another.
The NRA process is already quite similar in most countries, in terms of the factors
that are considered and the stakeholders that are consulted. This means that harmoni-
zation is not as farfetched as cynics think it might be.
Methods and models used for probability and consequence calculations are also
pretty similar (but not the same) in most countries; the exception is the consequence
calculation process in Germany, where authorities seek quantitative proof of ‘col-
lision-friendly’ design of turbines. Generally speaking, the calculation of accident
probability in NRA always considers shipping traffic using AIS data, whereas the
consequence calculations consider the typical mass and speeds (i.e. the kinetic
energy) of vessels. If the processes are to be harmonized further, the authors
recommend combining the consequence-assessment approach of Germany with
probabilistic tools used by Belgium and the Netherlands. Thus far, most risk-
control options have been focussed on reducing the probability of accidents, but
as the offshore wind sector continues to evolve, accidents may become inevitable; it
is thus prudent to understand the consequences of navigational accidents in more
detail, and promote measures such as ‘collision-friendly’ design on at least the
outermost turbines.
Harmonization does not mean that all countries or all OWFs should have the
same acceptability criteria. Each country should still approve OWFs individually,
based on what their approval authorities and local society perceive to be accept-
able levels of probability and consequences. Harmonization also does not mean
that the risk-control options implemented around OWFs to maintain navigational
safety need to be the same: e.g. countries should still be able to have different
safe-passing distances between shipping lanes and OWFs. Harmonization simply
means having the same steps and calculation methods for processes such as
probability or consequence assessments, to minimize discrepancies between coun-
tries as much as possible.
The IMO—based, for instance, on the experience of the North Sea countries—
should produce guidelines for probability and consequence calculation methods,
stakeholder consultation, etc. as they have done for accident investigation or FSA.
Ultimately, however, the implementation of the harmonization process should be
led by the countries themselves on a regional level; this would help to ensure that
countries around specific sea-basins (e.g. Baltic, Mediterranean or North Sea)
have common interpretations of the harmonized NRA process guidelines during
the implementation and application phase. A regional implementation approach
for harmonized NRA process should also promote further communication and
collaboration during the NRA process, and allow countries to share experiences
from mutual topics and issues. Having comprehensive and thorough guidelines in
place, and learning lessons from evolving and established countries, is a path that
should be followed by all emerging nations especially, who have ambitious
offshore energy plans.
It is also important to harmonize the NRA processes within the different coun-
tries. As mentioned by the respondent from Belgium, it is possible to have discrep-
ancies between the planning and approval stages, which may mean that OWFs-as-
planned are not OWFs-as-approved. This is where the Dutch and Belgian
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approaches clearly have an advantage. In the Netherlands, the federal authorities
themselves conduct a NRA and present the results to developers for strict adher-
ence—which means that the NRA is often the same through the planning to the
approval stages. In Belgium, developers are recommended to use the same tools,
methods and models for NRAs during the approval phases as the authorities use for
NRAs during planning phases, in order to minimize discrepancies.
5.1.2 Improving transparency, input data and tools used for NRA
Due to lack of consensus amongst the respondents, the authors cannot conclu-
sively state whether there is a need for more transparency, or if the models or input
data need to be improved further. Instead, the authors recommend that various
countries share the experiences in these matters through forums such as IMO
working groups, or regional platforms such as the Political Declaration on energy
cooperation between the North Seas Countries. In particular, countries that are
satisfied with their processes should share guidelines and ‘lessons-learnt’ with
countries that feel the need to improve their own NRA processes.
Promoting harmonization (see Section 5.1.1) can also indirectly lead to greater
transparency of models and input data: decision makers could scrutinize the calculation
methods and parameters much more closely before deciding on which model or tool to
advocate in any joint-standard.
Academia and industry stakeholders (particularly approval authorities, OWF
developers and NRA consultants) should work together to ensure that the best
possible methods, models and tools are used for NRA. Most national guidelines
are flexible and allow developers to use the tools of their choice as long as they
cover all the required factors. However, developers and consultative bodies should
move out of their comfort zone, and academics should promote their work
better—as improved models could lead to significantly help to reduce over- and
under-design for safety.
5.1.3 Improving stakeholder communication
There is also no consensus amongst the respondents on whether stakeholder commu-
nication needs to be improved. As with recommendation 2, the authors suggest a
sharing-of-experiences, and discussions between countries.
Although some might disagree, the authors advocate improving the communi-
cation of the NRA results to seafarers, and also feel that decision-support systems
should be made available (but not necessarily mandatory). This, in our opinion,
would be a step further than current Notices to Mariners. Having such decision
support systems could even help to alleviate some of the burden on planning and
approval authorities, and allow more effective use of sea space. Instead of having
fixed and expensive risk-control options (e.g. safety distances), for instance,
decision support systems, on board ships and in VTS centres for instance, can
provide more bespoke solutions for seafarers operating near OWFs, whilst ac-
counting for ‘live’ dynamic and static environmental conditions.
All these recommendations have the potential to reduce the administrative load on
OWF developers—but also more importantly, to significantly improve the planning and
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approval process of OWFs. This in turn can lead to more effective use of sea space, and
allow marine spatial planners as well as approval authorities to find the right balance
between navigational safety, efficiency and exploitation of space for energy generation.
5.2 Future work
The current work shows that despite a very good start, there is still a lot to be done when
it comes to NRA processes for OWFs. This is especially the case for countries that are
just now starting to develop an offshore wind portfolio. The potential for offshore wind
energy generation is immense all across the globe, and countries that wish to exploit this
resource would do well to follow in the footsteps of the North Sea countries.
In terms of research, the authors will further explore how each of the above
recommendations can be implemented in practice. In doing so, the NRA
processes in other countries with OWFs will also be analysed. Another impor-
tant future task will be to gather the perspectives of OWF owners and devel-
opers, as well as the opinions of international regulatory bodies on the subject
matter. Perhaps most importantly, future research will focus on producing
harmonized steps for the NRA process that can also be integrated with other
tools such as energy yield calculators and ship emission models; this may allow
for more effective decision making over use of sea space.
Given the need for more renewable energy and the sheer benefits of offshore
wind on one hand—and the importance of shipping and maritime activities on the
other—it is vital that the two industries learn to coexist sooner, rather than later.
This is easier said than done, given the predicted evolution and ambition of both
industries—but certainly not impossible. And it will surely require the combined
efforts of academics and maritime and offshore energy stakeholders to truly achieve
this goal of coexistence.
To conclude this discussion on the coexistence of the maritime and offshore wind
industries, perhaps the reader is best left with the words of Augustus William Hare:
‘Thought is the wind, knowledge the sail, and mankind the vessel’.
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